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Abstract
This paper develops a framework in which exchange takes place at pairwise markets in a
monetary economy with locations. In the economy there are several towns, each of which has
pairwise markets characterized by trading posts. At each trading post, taking prices as given,
agents submit commodities simultaneously with no resale, as opposed to an instantaneous
trading in the Walrasian economy. Commodities can be transported across towns with costs.
In this setting, we demonstrate that a trading center emerges in equilibrium if, and only if,
heterogeneity in transportation costs among towns is large enough.
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In the real world, we can observe that a large variety of commodities are
traded in a small number of locations. We call such a location a trading
center. The purpose of this paper is to explain where and why a trading
center emerges. To this end, we develop a simple model of a spatial economy
where exchange takes place at pairwise markets called trading posts. In the
model, there are several locations, or towns, each of which has trading posts
where a single commodity and at money are exchanged. We formulate a
trading center as a town at which active trading posts concentrate.
This paper builds on two strands of literature: monetary economics
and urban economics. In the traditional Walrasian economy, there is an
economy-wide market, and agents are allowed to instantly resell their pur-
chases. In such an economy, money plays no essential role, so that in order
to provide a theoretical foundation for monetary economics, one has to de-
part from the Walrasian economy. The trading post approach, introduced
by Shapley and Shubik (1977) and applied to a situation with at money by
Hayashi and Matsui (1996), postulates that there are trading posts where
prespecied pairs of objects are traded and that trade takes place simulta-
neously so that agents cannot use revenues from trade in one trading post
for purchase in other posts.1 Monetary exchange patterns can be explicitly
described by such a model. The present paper is an attempt to introduce the
concept of location into a model of monetary exchange with trading posts.
Spatial agglomeration in economic activities has been one of the central
issues in the eld of urban economics. It is often argued that the dierence in
transportation costs among locations plays an important role in generating
the asymmetry of economic activities. Recently, Konishi (2000) studies the
formation of transportation hub in a general equilibrium model with three
locations. He shows that when transportation costs between locations are
heterogeneous enough, a hub city emerges and population agglomeration oc-
curs in that city.2 The present paper addresses agglomeration in transaction
activities in a model of decentralized trade with trading posts.
We pursue these two lines described above by analyzing a simple spatial
model with trading posts. There are three towns and three types of perish-
able commodities in the economy. In each town, there are agents endowed
with a location-specic production technology. We assume the complete lack
of double coincidence of wants: residents in town i desire the commodity
produce in town i + 1 (mod 3). Commodities can be transported across
towns with the so-called \iceberg" transportation costs. There are three
1In Shapley and Shubik (1977), the price at a trading post is determined by the ratio
of aggregate oers of each of the two objects, while in Hayashi and Matsui (1996), there is
an auctioneer in each trading post, and each agent behaves as a price taker. The present
paper follows the latter.
2Berliant and Konishi (2000) study a model of market places with setup costs.
1trading posts in each town where exchange between each commodity and
at money takes place, so that any commodity is possibly traded in each
town. All trades occur simultaneously with no resale, so that any trade in-
volves the exchange of at money for commodities. Each agent can behave
as simultaneously a buyer and a seller in one period: as a buyer, he uses his
current money holdings to purchase the desired commodity; as a seller, he
produces his home commodity and then sells it to accumulate money that
is used in later periods. A trading center is dened to be a town where all
trading posts are active. Our goal is to identify the condition under which
concentration in transaction activities occurs. We show that in the presence
of positive transportation costs, a trading center can emerge in equilibrium
if, and only if, heterogeneity in transportation costs among towns is large
enough.
Economides and Siow (1988) also relate agglomeration in economic ac-
tivities to the distribution of markets, incorporating trading frictions into
a spatial economy. In their model, agents faced with endowment shocks
are located along a linear city. Each agent must select a market to partici-
pate in before his endowment is realized, unlike in the standard Walrasian
economy where agents can participate in a complete market structure with-
out rst going to any particular market location. Due to liquidity consid-
erations, agents prefer to trade in a single location, while transportation
costs have potential to spread trading activities over locations. Economides
and Siow (1988) illustrate this tradeo between liquidity and transportation
costs and show that in a Nash equilibrium, several markets operate. The
present paper diers from their paper in that in our model, agglomeration
is generated by heterogeneity in transportation costs, while in theirs, it is
caused by participation externality.
It is important to relate our framework to the spatial impossibility the-
orem due to Starrett (1978), which is one of the central results in urban
economics. The theorem says that if (i) markets are complete, (ii) markets
are perfectly competitive, (iii) there are no relocation costs, (iv) there are
no externalities, and (v) space is homogeneous, then there is no equilibrium
with a positive aggregate transportation cost in a closed spatial economy.
Thus, in order to demonstrate transaction agglomeration, we must violate
at least one of these conditions. The present paper drops (i) in that no resale
is assumed, as well as (iii) and (v). Examples which violate at least (i) and
(v) include Wang (1990), Berliant and Wang (1993), and Konishi (2000).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section
3 establishes our results. Section 4 concludes.
22. Model
We consider an innite horizon economy with locations inhabited by in-
nitely lived agents. Time is discrete, and periods are indexed by t (t =
0;1;:::). There are three towns f1;2;3g and three types of commodities
f1;2;3g in the economy. In addition, there is at money, which is dis-
tributed to the agents at time 0 in a lump-sum fashion. All commodities
completely perish within a period, while at money is completely durable.
In each town, there is a unit mass of identical agents. A typical agent who
lives in town i is denoted by i. Agent i can produce commodity i, i.e., each
agent has access to a location-specic production technology. Agent i de-
rives utility only from commodity i+1 (mod 3), so that there is a complete
lack of double coincidence of wants.3
In each town, there are three trading posts. At each trading post f0;jg,
j = 1;2;3, at money and commodity j are exchanged. We assume that in
each period, trading takes place simultaneously with no resale of commodi-
ties acquired in other trading posts. Thus, since commodities are completely
perishable and there is a lack of double coincidence of wants, agents other
than agents j 1 and j do not participate in the transaction at trading post
f0;jg.4
Commodities can be transported across towns with costs, while at
money can be transported with no cost. We assume that transportation
costs are paid by the transported commodity; in other words, the commod-
ity melts away during the transportation. Transportation of one unit of
commodity from town j to town k (j 6= k) requires (tjk  1)=tjk units of the
commodity, where tjk > 1. Here we assume that tjk = tkj for all distinct
j and k. Therefore, when one unit of commodity is transported between j
and k, only 1=tjk units arrive at the destination. We set tjj = 1.
Indirect transportation is allowed. If, for example, t12  t13 < t23 holds,
commodities can be transported from town 2 to town 3 through town 1 with
less cost. We dene [tjk] = minftjk;tj`  t`kg, where ` 6= j;k.
We assume that each agent must consume commodities in his own town.
If agent i obtains xi
i+1, yi
i+1, and zi
i+1 units of commodity i+1 from trading
posts in towns 1, 2, and 3, respectively, then the amount of his consumption














3This assumption, which is standard in the literature of search-theoretic monetary
economics (e.g., Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) and Green and Zhou (1998)), gives at money
an essential role as a medium of exchange.
4For the same reason, no barter trading posts could be used.







where ci(t) is the amount of i's consumption of commodity i + 1 at time t,
ki(t) is the amount of i's production of commodity i at time t, and  2 (0;1)
is the common discount factor.
The price of commodity j at trading post f0;jg in town 1 (town 2, town
3, respectively) at time t is denoted by pj(t) (qj(t), rj(t), respectively).5









































+ mi(t) = Mi(t);









m(t), respectively) is the money demand submitted to
post f0;ig in town 1 (town 2, town 3, respectively), mi(t) is the nominal
money balances not used for monetary exchange, and Mi(t) is the nominal
money balances at the beginning of time t. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
this problem are: for all i = 1;2;3, and all t = 0;1;2;:::,
t
[ti1]ci(t)
  i(t)pi+1(t)  0; \=" if xi
i+1(t) > 0, (KT1)
t
[ti2]ci(t)
  i(t)qi+1(t)  0; \=" if yi
i+1(t) > 0, (KT2)
t
[ti3]ci(t)
  i(t)ri+1(t)  0; \=" if zi




+ i(t + 1)  0; \=" if xi




+ i(t + 1)  0; \=" if yi
m(t) > 0, (KT5)
5We assume that the price of a trading post is always called, say, by an auctioneer,
even though no amount of commodity is submitted to the trading post. Otherwise, there
could be an equilibrium where all amount of commodity j is traded in a unique f0;jg




+ i(t + 1)  0; \=" if zi
m(t) > 0, (KT6)
i(t + 1)   i(t)  0; \=" if mi(t) > 0, (KT7)
  t + i(t)  0; \=" if ki(t) > 0. (KT8)
At trading post f0;ig in town 1, for example, if xi
i+1 units of commodity
i + 1 are to be obtained by agent i, then the amount of money that i needs
to pay is pi+1xi
i+1, which in turn is equal to agent i + 1's money demand
xi+1
m when the market clears. Equilibrium is thus dened as follows.








qi(t);ri(t); i = 1;2;3g1
t=0 such that:







mi(t);Mi(t);ki(t)g satises the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (KT1){(KT8)
with the constraints in the problem (1).










Trading post f0;jg is said to be active if a positive amount of at money
and commodity j are submitted to the post. We dene a trading center in
terms of active trading posts.
Denition 2. A town is said to be a trading center if all trading posts in
this town are active.
Throughout the rest of the paper, we focus only on stationary equilibria,
in which every variable is constant over time, while our model can generate
rich patterns of trading.
3. Results
In this section, we identify the condition under which concentration in trans-
action activities occurs. We show that in our environment with positive
transportation costs (i.e., tjk > 1 for all distinct j and k), a trading center
can emerge in equilibrium if, and only if, heterogeneity in transportation
costs among towns is large enough.
The rst proposition establishes the \only if" part: transaction concen-
tration does not occur unless transportation costs are suciently heteroge-
neous.
5Proposition 1. If town i is a trading center in a monetary equilibrium,
then
tii+1  tii+2  ti+1i+2: (2)
Proof. See Appendix.
For town i to be a trading center, the residents of town i + 1 and of town
i + 2 need to exchange in town i. Inequality (2) implies that the indirect
transportation through town i yields less cost for them than the direct trans-
portation between towns i + 1 and i + 2. If tii+1  tii+2 > ti+1i+2 holds for
all i, there exists no trading center: for each town i, trading post f0;i + 2g
does not activate.
Since (2) can not hold simultaneously for distinct towns, we obtain the
following.
Corollary 1. There is at most one trading center.
Next, the following claim claries where and why the trading center
emerges under large enough heterogeneity. An argument analogous to the
proof of Proposition 1 can be applied, so that the claim is stated without a
proof.
Claim 1. If tii+1  tii+2  ti+1i+2, then in a monetary equilibrium,
(a) trading post f0;ig is active in either town i or town i+2, or in both
towns;
(b) trading post f0;i + 1g is active in either town i or town i + 1, or in
both towns; and
(c) trading post f0;i + 2g is active in town i, i + 1, or i + 2 or some (or
all) of them.
The following proposition demonstrates that if inequality (2) holds, then
town i can become the trading center in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If tii+1tii+2  ti+1i+2, then there exists a monetary equi-
librium in which town i is a trading center.
Proof. See Appendix.
We construct in Appendix a stationary equilibrium where town 1 is the
trading center, which is depicted in Figure 1. In this equilibrium, all trading
posts in town 1 are active, while each of towns 2 and 3 has only one active
trading post: trading post f0;2g in town 2, and f0;1g in town 3. Fraction
 (2 (0;1)) of agents 1 sell at f0;1g in town 1 their production of commodity
1, which fraction  of agents 3 buy. The rest of agents 1 transport their
production to f0;1g in town 3 to trade with fraction 1    of agents 3. By
6utilizing at money they obtained in the previous period, fraction  (2 (0;1))
of agents 1 buy commodity 2 transported from town 2 at f0;2g in town 1,
and the rest of agents 1 buy commodity 2 at f0;2g in town 2. Since the
indirect transportation through town 1 provides less cost to agents 2 and
3, commodity 3 may be traded at f0;3g in town 1. In this equilibrium,
the whole amount of commodity 3, which is produced in town 3 and then
consumed in town 2, is traded in town 1.6
4. Conclusion
We have presented a simple spatial model with trading posts to demonstrate
concentration in transaction activities. The model allows us to depict the
trading center as a location where all trading posts activate and the suburbs
as locations where some of trading posts are inactive. We have shown that in
the presence of positive transportation costs, a town can become the trading
center in equilibrium if and only if the indirect transportation though this
town requires less cost than the direct transportation between the suburbs.
The present framework which includes at money would also allow us to
discuss various topics on monetary economics. We could examine the eect
of monetary policy on the distribution of transactions by introducing the
government, as in Alonso (2001) and Matsui (1998). We leave these issues
for future research.
6We also have equilibria where  = 0 or 1, and  = 0 or 1. In equilibria with  = 0
and/or  = 0, even though large enough heterogeneity exists, there is no trading center.
7Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. For the expositional convenience, we set i = 1. Sup-
pose that town 1 is a trading center.
Since town 1 is a trading center, trading post f0;3g at town 1 is active.
For the buyers of commodity 3 (the residents of town 2) to join trading post
























For p3, q3, and r3 satisfying (3){(6) to exist, we must have [t23]  [t12]
[t13], and hence,
t23  [t12]  [t13] (7)
(recall that [t23] = minft23;t12  t13g).
Since t12;t13 > 1, we obtain [t12] = minft12;t13  t23g = t12 and [t13] =
minft13;t12  t23g = t13 from (7), so that (7) implies t23  t12  t13.
Proof of Proposition 2. Setting Mi(0) = M for all i, we construct a sta-
tionary monetary equilibrium in which town 1 is the trading center (i.e., all
trading posts in town 1 are active), and trading post f0;2g in town 2 and
trading post f0;1g in town 3 are active.
Since x1
2;y1








That ki > 0 and xi




















From the constraints in (1), we have
x1
m(t) + z1
m(t) =  p1(t);
x2
m(t) + y2
m(t) =  q2(t);
x3
m(t) =  p3(t)=t13:
The above conditions together with market clearing conditions imply that


















































2 = (1   ); z1
2 = 0;
x1
m = M; y1
m = 0; z1






3 = 0; z2
3 = 0;
x2
m = M; y2
m = (1   )M; z2
m = 0;
x3
1 = ; y3
1 = 0; z3





m = M; y3
m = 0; z3
m = 0;
k1 = k2 = k3 = ;
m1 = m2 = m3 = 0;
constitutes a stationary monetary equilibrium, in which all trading posts in
town 1 are active, and trading post f0;2g in town 2, and trading post f0;1g
in town 3 are active.
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